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THE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES
IN ADULT JAILS AND PRISONS: A CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?
ANTHONY GIANNETTI t
I.

INTRODUCTION

One week after his sixteenth birthday, J.S.1 was arrested in
New York for several property and motor vehicle offenses
including petit larceny and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
Prior to these offenses, J.S. had no criminal history or any
involvement with the criminal justice system. However, under
New York law, which sets the jurisdictional age of the adult
criminal justice system at 16, 2 J.S. was tried in adult criminal court
as a youthful offender and sentenced to one-and-a-half to four
years in state prison. As part of a plea deal, J.S. agreed to serve six
months at a "Shock Incarceration" facility in lieu of one and a half
to four years in state prison.
However, his chances of surviving a six month sentence of
"Shock Incarceration" were destined to fail. Standing only five feet
two inches tall and weighing under one hundred thirty pounds, J.S.
had a diminutive stature and was frequently the target of bullying
while in school. While incarcerated, J.S. was housed in open
dormitories with older teens and men in their early twenties.
Because of his stature, he became the target of verbal abuse and
physical assault by both inmates and corrections officers. On at
least three occasions, J.S. was assaulted by corrections officers and
locked in a custodial closet overnight. These acts were allegedly
"TAnthony Giannetti is a student at SUNY Buffalo Law School, J.D. Candidate
2013.
'All information concerning J.S. was obtained from confidential interviews with
him and letters he wrote while incarcerated. As such, citations to these
interviews will be omitted.
2 As of 2007, New York and North Carolina are the only states that
set the
jurisdictional age of the adult criminal system at 16. See SCHUYLER CENTER FOR
ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY, RAISING THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN

NEW YORK

STATE:

THE

RIGHT THING

scaany.org/resources/documents/cpaenews

To Do 1 (2010), http://www.
issue23 raisetheage.pdf.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXX

done in retaliation against J.S. for attempting to write letters to his
family and file institutional grievances regarding the abusive
treatment he was receiving while incarcerated.
J.S.'s attempts to communicate his grievances failed. His
letters went unanswered; no official action was taken regarding his
grievances of physical abuse. The day after he was assaulted and
locked in a custodial closet for a third time, J.S. left the facility,
believing abscondment to be the only possibility for relief from
abuse. There was no secure perimeter at the facility. While on
work detail, J.S. simply walked out of the facility into the woods.
He was found the next day sitting by a lake, cold and hungry.
Following his capture, J.S. was transferred to a maximum
security adult prison where he was charged with violating various
prison regulations related to his escape. As a result of these3
charges, J.S. was sentenced to three years in solitary confinement,
in addition to other sanctions. Because he failed to complete his
required term of "Shock Incarceration," J.S.'s original sentence of
one-and-a-half to four years in state prison was reinstated. He may
also face criminal escape charges, which could result in an
additional sentence of up to five years in state prison. Recently,
J.S. celebrated his seventeenth birthday in solitary confinement.
This tragic account of a juvenile's experience in the adult
criminal justice system demonstrates how the adult system is often
ill-equipped to deal with juvenile offenders. Unfortunately,
however, this account of physical abuses, an inability to air
grievances, and placement in solitary confinement mirrors the
experiences of many juveniles caught in the adult system.4
3 In addition to being one of only two states that set the jurisdictional age of the

adult criminal system at 16, New York also leads the nation in the percentage of
inmates held in disciplinary solitary confinement. On April 23, 2003 7.6% of
New York inmates were held in disciplinary solitary confinement. The national
average for that same day was 2.5%. See CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., LOCKDOWN
NEW YORK: DISCIPLINARY

CONFINEMENT

IN NEW YORK STATE

PRISONS

20 (2003), (stating "New York's use of disciplinary segregation seems
extraordinarily high."), http://www.correctionalassociation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/05/lockdown-new-york report.pdf.
4 If not for punitive measures, many juveniles in adult prison are placed in
solitary confinement "for their own protection." See Jean Casella & James
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In recent years, juvenile justice policy in the United States
has become the focus of much scrutiny because of a growing
national trend favoring a more punitive approach to juvenile
offenders. 5 This trend began in the 1990's as a response to public
outcry against "out-of-control" juvenile crime and fear of a coming
generation of juvenile "super predators." 6 In response to this public
outcry, many state legislatures passed laws allowing greater
discretion by judges and prosecutors in transferring juveniles to
adult court.7 Between 1992 and 1997, 44 states and the District of
Columbia passed laws facilitating the transfer of juveniles to the
adult system. 8 As a result of these policy changes, an estimated
200,000 juveniles are tried annually as adults. 9 Additionally, on
any given day, an estimated 11,300 juvenile offenders are
incarcerated in adult facilities in the United States.10 This number
is a 662% increase from 1984.11
Ridgeway, Children in Lockdown: Solitary Confinement of Teens in
Adult Prison,SOLITARY WATCH, Jan. 30, 2010, http://solitarywatch.com/2010/

01/30/children-in-lockdown-part- I-solitary-confinement-of-kids-in-adultprisons/; Jean Casella and James Ridgeway, Children Routinely Held in PreTrial Solitary Confinement in Texas SOLITARY WATCH, October 22, 2010,

http://solitarywatch.com/2010/10/22/children-routinely-held-in-pre-trialsolitary-confinement-in-texas/.
5 SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 246 (4th ed.
2009).

6 MALCOLM C. YOUNG & JENNI GAINSBOROUGH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS AND
CONSEQUENCES

2 (2000), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/juvenile.pdf.

7

Id. at 4.
8 CHILDREN'S ACTION ALLIANCE,

PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN THE ADULT

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2003), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/
documents/AZ ProsecutingJuveniles.pdf.
9 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 16 (2007), http://

www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJJailing Juveniles Report 2007-11-15.pdf.
10 Casella & Ridgeway, Children in Lockdown: Solitary Confinement of Teens in
Adult Prison, supra note 4.
11 See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN
ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 5 (2000), http://www.

ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/bja/182503 .pdf.
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However, this trend of imposing adult punishments on
juvenile offenders has been subjected to some judicial constraints
in recent years. Specifically, the recent Supreme Court decisions in
Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Floridahave limited state and
federal authority to impose adult punishments on juvenile
offenders consistent with the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes
were committed.12 Similarly, in Graham, the Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment does not permit a juvenile offender to
be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicide
crime. 13 In both of these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that
juveniles are categorically less culpable for their crimes than adults
and as a result,
are less deserving of the most severe
14
punishments.
Taking into consideration the recent Supreme Court
decisions above, this paper will address whether the imposition of
solitary confinement on a juvenile in adult prison violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. In answering this question affirmatively, this paper
will argue that solitary confinement of juveniles in adult prison is
(1) very likely to cause serious injury to juveniles' future health in
all circumstances and (2) a disproportionate punishment for
juvenile offenders in light of their diminished culpability when
applied for punitive reasons. Moreover, an international consensus
against the practice, as evidenced in international treaties and the
resolutions of regional human rights institutions, support finding
the practice to be violative of the Eighth Amendment. 15 Beyond
the scope of the Eighth Amendment, this paper will address the
12Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
13Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 23-24
14
Id. at 16-17; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.

(U.S. May 17, 2010).

15 See generally Graham, No. 08-7412; Roper, 543 U.S. In both cases, the

existence of an international consensus against a particular practice was
persuasive evidence in finding that practice to be violative of the Eighth
Amendment.
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solitary confinement of juveniles from a policy perspective and
argue that the practice is counterproductive and serves no useful
social purpose.
II.

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES

According to the United States Department of Justice,
solitary confinement is defined as: "locking an inmate in an
isolated cell for an average of twenty-three hours per day with
limited human interaction, little constructive activity, and an
16
environment that assures maximum control over the individual."
While definitions may vary from facility to facility, for purposes of
this paper solitary confinement will be defined by the above
standard. The terms "solitary confinement" and "isolation" will be
used interchangeably throughout this paper.
Solitary confinement as a penal technique is thought to
have been first used at the Hospital San Michele at Rome, in
1703.17 However, the practice gained significant notoriety for its
use in the Walnut-Street Penitentiary experiment in Philadelphia in
1787.18 According to Dr. Stuart Grassian, the United States was
actually the world leader in introducing solitary confinement as a
means of dealing with criminal behavior with the rise of the
penitentiary system in the early nineteenth century. 19 This system,
"originally labeled the 'Philadelphia System,' involved almost
exclusive reliance upon solitary confinement as a means of
incarceration" and rehabilitation of individuals with socially
deviant behaviors. 20 However, the system fell into disfavor and
was ultimately abandoned after numerous inmates detained in the
16 CHASE RIVELAND, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW
AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (1999),

http://nicic.org/pubs/1999/014937.

pdf.

17In Re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1890).
18 Id. at 168.

19Stuart Grassian, PsychiatricEffects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.
L. & POL'Y 325, 328 (2006).
20 [d.
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system exhibited severe mental disturbances described as a "florid
delirium, characterized by severe confusional, paranoid, and
hallucinatory features, and also by intense agitation and random,
impulsive, often self-directed violence.'
In 1890, the Supreme Court recognized the severe
psychological harm caused to inmates by solitary confinement in
the case of In Re Medley:
This matter of solitary confinement is not . . . a mere
unimportant regulation as to the safe-keeping of the
prisoner ....But experience [has] demonstrated that there
were serious objections to it. A considerable number of the
prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semifatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others
still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did
not recover sufficient mental activity
to be of any
22
community.
the
to
service
subsequent
In Medley, the Supreme Court reviewed a change in the state laws
of Colorado pertaining to the confinement of inmates waiting to be
executed. Mr. Medley was convicted of murdering his wife in 1889
and sentenced to death. Under the statute in force at the time of the
murder, Mr. Medley would have been held in the county jail prior
to his execution. However, between the murder and his trial, the
Colorado legislature passed a statute requiring condemned inmates
to be held in solitary confinement in state prison for one month
prior to their execution. Mr. Medley was sentenced under the new
statute and argued that its application imposed a substantial burden
on him in violation of the ex postfacto clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court agreed, viewing one month of solitary

21

id.

22 Medley, 143 U.S. at 167-68.
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confinement as a substantial enough burden to warrant application
of the ex postfacto clause.23
Medley is significant because it was the first case to
explicitly recognize the potentially disastrous effects of solitary
confinement. Additionally, it was the first case to subject the
practice to constitutional scrutiny. While Medley analyzed solitary
confinement under the ex post facto clause, it is still noteworthy
because it was the first case to strike down a term of solitary
confinement on constitutional grounds. It also stands for the more
general proposition that solitary confinement, in some
circumstances, may violate the Constitution.
Since Medley, state and federal courts have heard numerous
cases involving Eighth Amendment challenges to the practice of
solitary confinement. However, thus far, solitary confinement has
withstood these challenges and is not per se violative of the Eighth
Amendment. 24 Despite not being struck down as a per se Eighth
Amendment violation, the practice of solitary confinement now
seems to be on questionable constitutional footing. Consider the
following reports authored by the Department of Justice's National
Institute on Corrections. The 1999 report states, "Generally, the
overall constitutionality of these programs [solitary confinement
programs] remains unclear." 25 The 2004 report describes the
current status of solitary confinement programs as "Living on the
constitutional edge." 26 Nonetheless, the report concluded:
The fact that an ECU's 27 extremely restrictive conditions
place it at the very edge of what is constitutionally
permissible suggests that, with properly developed policies
3Id. at 161-62.
24 See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting "long line of cases

... holding that solitary confinement per se is not 'cruel and unusual').
25 RIVELAND, supra note 16, at 2.
26 WILLIAM C. COLLINS, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX PRISONS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: LIABILITY CONCERNS IN THE EXTENDED CONTROL UNIT 8

(2004), http://nicic.gov/pubs/2004/019835.pdf.
27

Id. at V. (defining ECU (Extended Control Unit) as a term for a prison's

solitary confinement unit.)
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and procedures, it can function in a constitutionally
acceptable fashion.28
However, the report did concede, given the current trend in state
and federal courts, that solitary confinement "may inherently step
over the constitutional edge with regard to mental health issues for
some inmates." 29 The question, then, is: In what circumstances
does solitary confinement step over the constitutional edge?
III.

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted., 30 There is no static test that determines
whether conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 3 1 The inquiry is largely fact-intensive. However, in
order to plead a successful Eighth Amendment claim against a
prison official, two requirements must be satisfied. First, the
deprivation alleged must be, "objectively, sufficiently serious,"
resulting in the denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities."' 32 Secondly, the prison official imposing the
33
deprivation must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind.,
That is, the prison official must subjectively act with "deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety." 34 A showing of deliberate
indifference requires more than "ordinary lack of due care for the
prisoner's interests or safety" and has recently been interpreted by
the Supreme Court to be comparable to a recklessness standard.3 5

28

1d.at8.

29 [d.

3oU.S.CONST. amend. VIII.
31 Davenport v. De Robertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1988).

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

32

33 id.
34 id.
35

1 d.at 835.
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A. Psychological Pain and Suffering
Traditionally, in evaluating whether a condition of
confinement is sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth
Amendment, courts have focused on the basic components of
physical sustenance: food, shelter, and medical care. 36 However, as
noted above, during a more recent trend, courts have recognized
the inhumanity of institutionally-imposed psychological
pain and
37
Amendment.
Eighth
the
violating
suffering as
Generalized psychological pain incident to confinement
such as boredom, loneliness, and frustration does not rise to the
level of Eighth Amendment scrutiny. 3 8 Yet, if the particular
conditions of segregation being challenged are such that they
inflict a serious mental illness, greatly exacerbate mental illness, or
deprive inmates of their sanity, then courts have held inmates have
been deprived of a basic necessity of human existence in
contravention of the Eighth Amendment. 3 9 The Supreme Court has
adopted a two prong test to determine whether conditions of
confinement constitute a risk to inmate health sufficient to warrant
Eighth Amendment scrutiny. According to the Court, the critical
inquiry concerns whether:
(1) the risk involved was 'unreasonable' in that the
challenged conditions were 'sure,'
'very likely,' or
'imminent[ly]' likely to cause 'serious' damage to the
inmate's future health, and (2) whether society considers
the risk to be 'so grave that it violates contemporary
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such
4
a risk.' 0
For instance, in Madrid,the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California considered the constitutionality
36 d. at 832.
37 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d
855 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
38See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986).
39 Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1264.
40 Id. at 1265 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)).
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of conditions of confinement in the Secure Housing Unit at a
California state prison. While the court declined to find the
conditions of confinement in that unit a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment, the court concluded that the conditions of
confinement, as applied to mentally ill inmates, or those inmates
"who the record demonstrates are at a particularly high risk for
suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental health,"
constituted an "unreasonable risk" that is surely not one "today's
society would choose to tolerate. 4 1 In short, the court held that the
confinement of the above subgroup of prisoners in the SHU
deprived them of a basic human necessity, mental health, in
contravention of the Eighth Amendment.4 2 The court analogized
placing these inmates in SHU to placing an asthmatic in a room
43
with little air to breathe.
The threshold question for the court in this case was
whether there was "persuasive evidence that the challenged
conditions lead to serious mental injury." 44 In answering this
question affirmatively, the court pointed to the "conditions of
extreme social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation,"
combined with the particular susceptibility of the above subgroup
to mental injury.4 5
Similarly, in Ruiz, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas found the administrative segregation of
mentally ill inmates to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment
based on the substantial psychological harm caused by deprivation
of human contact and mental stimuli. 46 Again, the court focused on
the particular susceptibility of this subgroup to psychological
harm, relying on the testimony of a psychiatrist who stated that
"such inmates," by virtue of their particular condition, "need
contact and social stimuli., 47 The court concluded that depriving
41 Id.

at 1265-66.

42 Id.

41 Id. at 1265.
44

Id. at 1264.
45 Id. at 1265.
46

Ruiz, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 913.

47 Id. at 912.
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this group of inmates of adequate contact and stimulation
amounted to a form of psychological torture prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment:
As the pain and suffering caused by a cat-o'-nine-tails
lashing an inmate's back are cruel and unusual punishment
by today's standards of humanity and decency, the pain and
suffering caused by extreme levels of psychological
deprivation are equally, if not more, cruel and unusual. The
wounds and resulting scars, while less tangible, are no less
painful and permanent when they are inflicted on the
human psyche.48
It is important to note that the above decisions establishing
Eighth Amendment violations for conditions of solitary
confinement are district court decisions with limited precedential
value. There is a general lack of federal appellate court decisions
concerning the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to solitary
confinement on the grounds that it constitutes impermissible
psychological torture. 49 However, Madrid and Ruiz are significant
in that they stand for the proposition that solitary confinement, as
applied to certain individuals, may violate the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, this holding is not explicitly limited to those with
diagnosed mental illnesses. Specifically, in Madrid,the court held
solitary confinement implicates the Eighth Amendment when
applied to inmates "who the record demonstrates are at a
particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to
their mental health., 50 This expansive class definition certainly
leaves open the possibility for other challenges to solitary
confinement.

48

49
50

Id. at 914.
supranote 26, at 10.
Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1265.
COLLINS,

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXX

B. Solitary Confinement as a Disproportionate
Punishment
Beyond challenges to solitary confinement based on the
psychological pain it causes, solitary confinement may violate the
Eighth Amendment if the length of confinement is extremely
disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or is otherwise
without sufficient penological justification. 5 1 The Supreme Court
has recognized that "the concept of proportionality is central to the
Eighth Amendment., 52 Proportionality analysis "requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of
their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the
punishment in question." 53 Punishment disproportionate to the
offense committed constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment,
54
time.
prison
without
or
with
imposed
whether
However, prison officials are given broad discretion in
administering prisons, 55 and this broad discretion extends to
determining the length of disciplinary sentences for violations of
prison regulations. 56 Only in rare circumstances will a court find a
sentence of solitary confinement to be violative of the Eighth
Amendment based on a proportionality analysis. For instance, in
Horne v. Coughlin, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
declined to find an Eighth Amendment proportionality violation
where a mentally retarded, functionally illiterate inmate was
detained for six months in solitary confinement for making
sexually suggestive remarks to a female civilian volunteer.57 The
inmate allegedly made the following remarks to the female
volunteer: "Just give me a little kiss on the cheek or anywhere else
you please ....I wouldn't do bad to a woman and she gives it up
cause she wants it.",58 Despite the inmate's I.Q. of 65, and
51O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974).
52 Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 22 (U.S. May 17, 2010).
53Id. at 37.
54 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
55 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983).
56
id.
57 Home v. Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1998).
5
1 [d. at 27-28.
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relatively innocuous nature of the remarks, the court summarily
rejected his proportionality claim, with the analysis occupying only
three sentences of the opinion. 59
Similarly, in Sostre v. McGinnis, the same appeals court
declined to find an Eighth Amendment proportionality violation
where an inmate was sentenced to an indefinite term of solitary
confinement for (1) attempting to mail a legal motion on behalf of
his codefendant to a NAACP attorney and (2) refusing to answer
questions concerning his involvement in an alleged black separatist
organization. 60 There, the court iterated the significant degree of
deference granted to state officials in administering prisons as a
primary rationale for rejecting the proportionality claim. As the
court opined, "[flor a federal court . . . to place a punishment

beyond the power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic
interference with the state's free political and administrative
processes." 61 The court declined to find the sentence
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment despite its
recognition that the sentence may be "unsound"
or even
"personally repugnant" to some of the justices. 62
The above decisions reflect the reluctance of courts to
interfere with the discretion of prison administrators, particularly
in imposing sanctions for violations of prison regulations. This is
true even when severe sanctions are imposed for de minimis
infractions.
However, the discretion of prison officials is not unlimited.
In some circumstances, courts will void disciplinary sentences as
unconstitutionally disproportionate. For instance, in Chapman v.
Pickett,the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found a seven
month sentence in solitary confinement to be unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the offense of refusing to handle pork while on
kitchen clean up detail.63 There, the court based its decision, in
part, on the fact that the inmate refused to handle pork for religious
59

60

Id. at 31.

Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 183, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1971).
at 191.

61 Id.
62

id.

63 Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 28 (7th Cir. 1978).
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reasons, seeming to insinuate that the punishment might not have
64
been disproportionate had the inmate refused for other reasons.
Similarly, in Adams v. Carlson, a case remanded for factual
determinations by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois upheld the
Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim of 36 inmates who
served 16 months in solitary confinement for participating, or
attempting to participate, in a prison work stoppage as a protest
against prison conditions. 65 While the court based its decision on a
disproportionality analysis, it also discussed, at length, the
particularly oppressive conditions of the Secure Housing Unit at
Marion Penitentiary. The inmates were confined to 8 by 6 cells for
23-and-a-half hours per day. 66 Moreover, the inmates were denied
access to radios, commissary, clocks, educational materials, and
were often required to eat from the floors of their cells. 67 It seems
evident that these conditions played at least some role in the
court's finding of an Eighth Amendment violation.
Based on the above cases, there does not appear to be a
definitive, or even principled, test to determine when a disciplinary
sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate. Beyond ideological
differences between circuits, it is difficult to reconcile the
conclusions reached in Sostre and Adams. In both cases, the
offenses were of relatively equal magnitude, yet Sostreupheld an
indefinite sentence while Adams struck down a 16 month sentence.
It seems that courts may be likely to find a sentence
disproportionate where additional factors, beyond the length of the
sentence itself, are present. In Sostre, the particular conditions of
the solitary confinement unit were significant while in Chapman,
the constitutionally protected nature of the inmate's refusal to
follow an order was highlighted. In light of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Roper and Graham,the young age of an inmate
may be a persuasive additional factor supporting a finding of
disproportionality.
64
65
66
67

Id. at 24.
Adams v. Carlson, 368 F. Supp. 1050, 1053-54 (E.D. I1. 1973).
Id. at 1052.
[d.
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SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES
VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
BECAUSE IT CAUSES SERIOUS DAMAGE
TO JUVENILES' FUTURE HEALTH

As stated above, The Supreme Court has adopted a two
prong test to determine when conditions of confinement constitute
a risk to inmate health sufficient to warrant Eighth Amendment
scrutiny. The critical inquiry is whether:
(1) the risk involved was 'unreasonable' in that the
challenged conditions were 'sure,'
'very likely,' or
'imminent[ly]' likely to cause 'serious' damage to the
inmate's future health, and (2) whether society considers
the risk to be 'so grave that it violates contemporary
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such
68
a risk.'
Solitary confinement, as applied to juveniles, satisfies this test
because it causes serious damage by inhibiting the normal
psychological development of juveniles. As discussed below, this
inhibition is irreversible and may have substantial impacts on the
juvenile later in life, including impaired cognitive and social
functioning. Like the mentally ill inmates in Ruiz and Madridwho
were particularly susceptible to the psychological harm of isolation
by virtue of their abnormal brain functioning, juveniles are
similarly susceptible to these harms by virtue of their
underdeveloped brains.
Adolescence is a crucial and necessary period of plasticity
when brain circuitry and behavior are beginning to be
established. 6 9 These changes in brain circuitry and functioning that
occur during adolescence most significantly impact brain regions
68

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995)

69 DANIEL R. WEINBERGER ET AL., THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN
PREGNANCY,

THE ADOLESCENT

BRAIN:

A

WORK

IN

PROGRESS

http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/BRAIN.pdf.

2 (2005),
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associated with response inhibition, planning, the calibration of
risk and reward, and emotion regulation. 70 Moreover, the
opportunities and constraints created by a child's environment play
an important role in this period of development. 71 Current research
suggests that isolation 72 affects adolescent brain development, and
ultimately, adult maturation. Essentially, in order to develop fully,
the juvenile brain needs environmental stimuli and social
interaction. Without such stimuli and interaction during this critical
period, development will be substantially impaired. Consider the
sworn statement of Dr. Stuart Grassian, an expert on the effects of
solitary confinement, in his affidavit from the J.S. case discussed
above:
The risk of permanent harm from long-term SHU
confinement is especially great for a young person such as
J.S. At 16 years old, the brain is not fully developed. The
brain learns, especially in youth; its plasticity is critical to
emotional and cognitive maturation. But it cannot do so in
isolation; it needs experience - things to "chew on," to
learn from. Depriving J.S. of the opportunity for such
experience now, at such a critical developmental period
will inevitably prevent and distort development. I am
particularly concerned about J.S.'s relationship with
people. Many people who have spent time in solitary
73
confinement become intolerant of personal relationships.
The harm caused to juveniles by isolation is distinctly
different and more severe than the harm caused to adults because
of its irreparability. Once the developmental window passes for a
70 See Laurence Steinberg et al., Adolescent Development andJuvenile Justice,5
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 466 (2009).

71Werner Greve, Imprisonment of Juveniles and Adolescents: Deficits and
Demandsfor Developmental Research, 5 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 21, 26 (2001).

72 Ben Kleinman, Administrative and Punitive Segregation of Juveniles in Jails
and Prisons: Cruel, Unusual, and Awaiting Condemnation 20 (Jan. 2008)
(unpublished paper, available at: http://works.bepress.com/ben kleinman/3).
73 Grassian, Affidavit, 29(December 18, 2010).
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juvenile, the brain cannot go back and redevelop at some point in
the future; the developmental effects are likely permanent. This
inhibition of development not only fundamentally alters the
cognitive abilities of the juvenile, but, as mentioned above and
below, significantly impacts social relationships and social
identity.74 Consider the following opinion of Dr. Craig Haney,
professor of psychology at the University of California at Santa
Cruz:
The political stereotype is that a fourteen- or sixteen-yearold who commits an adult crime must be as sophisticated as
an adult when paradoxically these kids are most often
younger than their age emotionally. Regardless of what
they have done, they are in an uncertain, unformed state of
social identity. These are kids who are the least appropriate
to place in solitary confinement. Not only are you putting
them [juveniles] in a situation where they have nothing to
rely on but their own, underdeveloped internal
mechanisms, but you are making it impossible for them to
develop a healthy functioning adult social identity. You're
basically taking someone who's in the process of finding
out who they are and twisting their psyche in a way that
will make it very, very difficult for them to ever recover. 75
Again, the high likelihood of irreparable damage is of concern to
Dr. Haney. While isolation certainly poses immediate
psychological harm to both adults and juveniles, the long term
effects on juveniles are potentially disastrous. Isolation of juveniles
is likely to result in the formation of an adult personality that is
cognitively and socially impaired, essentially depriving the
individual of any chance of functioning normally in society.
This is problematic from a policy perspective because a
significant portion of the 11,300 juveniles incarcerated annually in
74 See Kleinman, supranote 72 at 17 (stating "the lack of stimulation could be a

missed opportunity for continued development").
75 Matt Olson, Kids in the Hole

2003) (quoting Craig Haney).
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adult facilities will, at some point, return to society. Most of these
juveniles will have been held in solitary confinement for some
period of their incarceration. 76 The distorted cognitive and social
development resulting from isolation is likely to cause problems
reintegrating into society and may lead to anti-social behavior and
subsequent incarceration. This is especially true considering the
developmental faculties that are likely disrupted by isolation,
calibration of risk and reward and emotional regulation. 77 It seems
apparent that an individual who is released from prison with an
inability to assess risks and rewards or effectively regulate his
emotions is at much greater risk for reoffending. Evidence for this
theory can be found in research indicating that juveniles processed
in adult criminal court are more likely to recidivate than those
processed in juvenile court. 78 Infact, at least one study pointed to
the use of solitary confinement in adult facilities
as one factor that
79
may contribute to higher rates of recidivism.
Considering the evidence above, the grave potential of
future harm posed to juveniles by solitary confinement is at least as
severe as the harm faced by the inmates in Madridand Ruiz, which
was sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation under
the Supreme Court's two prong test. In fact, the harm posed to
juveniles may be more substantial because of its irreparability.
Juveniles, like the inmates in Madrid and Ruiz, are "at a particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to
[their] mental health" because their brains will not fully develop in
76 Casella & Ridgeway, Children in Lockdown: Solitary Confinement ofTeens in
Adult Prison, supra note 4.

77 Steinberg, supra note 70, at 466.

78 See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice

System, 27 CRIME & JUSTICE 81, 81 (2000) (concluding "there is credible
evidence to that prosecution and punishment in the adult system increase the
likelihood of recidivism"); RICHARD E. REDDING, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE

DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 4 (2010) (finding "large-scale studies indicate

that youth tried in adult criminal court generally have greater recidivism rates
after release than those tried in juvenile court").
79 Bishop, supra note 78 at 139.
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isolation. 80 From a policy perspective, this risk is intolerable and
violative of contemporary standards of decency because it
essentially prevents affected juveniles from becoming normally
adjusted adults in society. Moreover, it places these juveniles at
much greater risk for reoffending when they are released.
V.

PUNITIVE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF
JUVENILES VIOLATES THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IS A
DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT

As stated above, the Supreme Court has recognized that
juveniles are categorically less culpable for their crimes than adults
and, as a result, are less deserving of the most severe
punishments8 1 . The Supreme Court has recognized at least two
fundamental differences between adults and juveniles that support
a finding of diminished juvenile culpability. First, "[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found
in youth more often that in adults and are more understandable
among the young., 82 Second, the "character of a juvenile is not as
well formed as that of an adult," 83 making it less likely that
juveniles fall amongst the "worst offenders."
In the prison context, solitary confinement is the harshest
penalty available to prison administrators. It is analogous to the
imposition of the death penalty in criminal law. There is a broad
range of less severe sanctions available to prison administrators
that include restrictions on inmate privileges ranging from
reducing personal visits to limiting commissary. Just as the
Supreme Court has categorically presumed juveniles to be unfit for
the harshest penalty in the context of criminal law because of their
diminished culpability, 84 juveniles are similarly unfit for the
harshest penalty in the prison context for the same reason.
80
81

82
83

14

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).

Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 49 (U.S. May 17, 2010).
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Current scientific research suggests that "juveniles lack the
culpability of adults because their brains are fundamentally and
significantly different from adult brains."85 The brain's frontal
lobe, which exercises control over impulsive behavior, does not
even begin to mature until seventeen years of age. 86 Because
juveniles lack a developed frontal lobe, they tend to process
decisions in the limbic system, the part of the brain charged with
instinctive (and often impulsive) reactions. 87 An adult's fully
developed frontal lobe is typically able to curb impulsive decisions
88
coming from other parts of the brain such as the limbic system.
The same is not true for juveniles. As such, normal juveniles
cannot be expected to operate with the level of maturity, judgment,
risk aversion or impulse control of an adult. 89 Essentially, many of
the foolish, sometimes criminal, decisions made by juveniles can
be attributed to their undeveloped frontal lobes. It is not a novel
proposition that juveniles often make impulsive decisions. For this
reason, juveniles are not afforded the same privileges as adults
such as driving, voting, and drinking privileges. For this same
reason, juveniles should not be subjected the same severe penalties
as adults, particularly the death penalty and solitary confinement.
Beyond diminished culpability, the solitary confinement of
juveniles is a disproportionate punishment because the psychological pain experienced by juveniles is subjectively greater
than that experienced by adults. At least one federal district court
in New York has recognized the disparate impact of solitary
confinement on juveniles:
[E]xtended isolation of a youngster exposes him to
conditions equivalent to 'sensory deprivation.' This is a
state of affairs which will cause a normal adult to begin
8 Tracy Rightmer, Juveniles' Immature Brains Make Them Less Culpable Than
Adults, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 4 (2005).

16 [d. at 24.
" David E. Arredondo, Principlesof Child Development and Juvenile Justice,
Informationfor Decision-Makers, 5 J. CTR.
129 (2004).
8 Rightmer, supranote 85, at 24.
89

Id. at 23-24.
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experiencing psychotic-like symptoms, and will push a
troubled person in the direction of serious emotional
illness. What is true in this case for adults is of even greater
concern with children and adolescents. Youngsters are in
general more vulnerable to emotional pressures than mature
adults; isolation is a condition of extraordinarily severe
psychic stress; the resultant impact on the mental health of
the individual exposed to such stress
will always be serious,
90
and can occasionally be disastrous.
Because juveniles require more emotional support and human
interaction than adults, the negative impacts of solitary
confinement are exacerbated as applied to juveniles. Additionally,
juveniles subjectively experience any given duration of sanction as
longer because of how they experience time. 9' In practical terms,
sentencing a juvenile to 36 months in solitary confinement, as was
the case with J.S., while extremely severe in and of itself, is much
more severe than an equivalent sentence for a 32 year old man. For
J.S., such a sentence amounts to nearly 20% of his current lifespan,
while, for the 32 year old, the same sentence amounts to just under
10% of his current lifespan. In Graham, the Supreme Court
explicitly adopted this reasoning as a factor in finding life without
parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders an unconstitutionally
disproportionate punishment. As Justice Kennedy stated in
Graham:
Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a
juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his
life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a
75-year-old each sentenced to life92without parole receive
the same punishment in name only.
90 Lollis v. New York Dep't Soc. Servs., 322 F.Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

(quoting affidavit of Dr. Joseph D. Noshpitz, M.D.).
91 Arredondo, supra note 87, at 131.

92 Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 43 (U.S. May 17, 2010).
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This disproportionate effect of solitary confinement on
juveniles in terms of (1) the greater qualitative level of suffering
they experience compared to adults and (2) the subjectively longer
quantitative duration of punishment they experience compared to
adults, supports finding an Eighth Amendment violation. These
disparate qualitative and quantitative impacts on juveniles might be
a sufficient "additional factor" to reach a conclusion of
disproportionality. Recall Adams, where the Seventh Circuit found
a 16 month sentence of solitary confinement to be unconstitutionally disproportionate based, in part, on the particularly
oppressive conditions of the confinement cells. Here, the
particularly oppressive effect of solitary confinement on juveniles,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, supports the same finding.
VI.

INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBITING THE
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES
IS INSTRUCTIVE TO THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

It is well settled that the laws and customs of the
international community are instructive in defining the scope and
content of Federal Constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has
unequivocally endorsed this position:
For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law
of the United States recognizes the law of nations ....

It

would take some explaining to say now that the federal
courts must avert their gaze entirely 93
from any international
norm intended to protect individuals.
Also consider the opinion of former Supreme Court Justice
Harry Blackmun:

93 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-30 (2004).
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The early architects of our Nation understood that the
customs of nations - the global opinion of
mankind 94
nation.
forged
newly
the
on
binding
be
would
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the
significance of customary international law in interpreting the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishments." The Court's history is replete with cases in which
international standards have informed the Court's view of what
constitutes "cruel and unusual punishments." 95 In determining
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts look to the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 96 These standards of decency are not limited to
the confines of our national borders.
The practice of imposing solitary confinement on juveniles
violates customary international law and international agreements,
specifically the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).97
Customary international law is that which "results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation." 98 International agreements "create law for the
states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary
international law when such agreements are intended for adherence
94 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE
L.J. 39, 39 (1994).

95 See Graham, No. 08-7412 at 62-63 (noting the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against life without parole for non-homicide offenses
committed by juveniles); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005)
(noting the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.304, 316 (2002) (considering the

national and international community's rejection of death penalty for persons
with mental retardation); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (noting
"virtual unanimity" within international community that denationalization
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
96 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.

97 Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.273, 58, a-b (Sept. 30, 2005) (recommending "abolition of the
practice" but for "very exceptional cases").
9' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (1987).
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by states generally and are in fact widely accepted." 99 Furthermore,
"a very widespread and representative participation in a convention
100
might suffice of itself' to establish customary international law.
The prohibition against the use of solitary confinement on
juveniles satisfies the above criteria. It is a customary practice and
treaty rule under the CRC, ratified by all countries except the
United States and Somalia. 10 1 Article 37 of the CRC provides, in
part, "No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment . . ." and "[e]very child
deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which
takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age." The
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the treaty body that
monitors compliance with the CRC, has interpreted Article 37 to
preclude the use of solitary confinement but for "very exceptional
02
cases" and has otherwise mandated abolition of the practice.'
Moreover, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty, adopted by the General Assembly,
strictly prohibit placement in "closed or solitary0 confinement"
as a
3
form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.'
Regional human rights institutions, particularly the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), have likewise
condemned the imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles.
The IACHR is a permanent body of the Organization of American
States (OAS) that is responsible for adopting human rights
standards for member states. The IACHR has interpreted the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which the
99 Id. at §102(3).

100 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Denmark & Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 42 (February 20).
101The United States and Somalia are the only countries in the world that failed

to ratify the CRC. However, Somalia has recently announced plans to ratify the
CRC. See Somalia to Join Child Rights Pact: UN, REUTERS AFRICA, Nov. 20,
2009, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE5AJOIT
20091120.
102Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.273, 58, a-b (Sept. 30, 2005).
103 G.A. Res. 45/113, 67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990).
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United States has ratified, to strictly forbid the imposition of
solitary confinement on children deprived of liberty.' 0 4 In fact, this
prohibition is binding on all member states as a result of the
unanimous ratification of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man.
Virtually all countries in the world have rejected the
imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles by virtue of the
near unanimous ratification of the CRC. The position of the
IACHR provides additional support for international condemnation
of the practice. These treaty provisions and findings of treaty
bodies, while not dispositive, are highly persuasive that solitary
confinement of juveniles constitutes a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. A comparison to Roper is illustrative.
In Roper, the Supreme Court considered whether the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles amounts to a violation
of the Eighth Amendment. In answering this question
affirmatively, the Court referred to the laws of other countries and
international authorities as instructive in interpreting the scope of
the Eighth Amendment. In particular, the Court referred to Article
37 of the CRC, which contains an express provision against the
death penalty for juveniles. The court noted the near unanimous
ratification of the CRC as evidence of international condemnation
of the practice. This nearly unanimous international consensus was
cited prominently as a factor in the court's decision:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in
the stark reality that the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty' l 5 . It is proper that we acknowledge
the overwhelming weight of international opinion against
the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the
104

Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of

Liberty in the Americas, Principle XXII(3), OEA/Ser/L/V/ 1. 131 doc. 26 (March
14, 2008).
105 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
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understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance
10 6
of young people may often be a factor in the crime.
Here, the same considerations are present. Article 37 has
been interpreted by a competent treaty body, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, to preclude the use of solitary confinement but
for "very exceptional cases." While Article 37 does not contain an
express provision against the imposition of solitary confinement,
this distinction is irrelevant. As discussed above, the reasoning in
Roper focused on the existence of an international norm against the
practice of the juvenile death penalty and the "overwhelming
weight of international opinion." The lack of expressness of a
particular treaty provision has no bearing on the weight or
normative status of that provision. Hence, the international
consensus against juvenile solitary confinement is not diminished
because Article 37 lacks an express provision against it.
The international consensus against juvenile solitary
confinement is evident based on the near unanimous ratification of
the CRC, the unequivocal positions of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child and the United Nations General assembly
regarding the scope of the CRC, and the categorical prohibition
against juvenile solitary confinement adopted by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. Such an international
consensus strongly supports the finding that juvenile solitary
confinement is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

While the recent decisions in Graham and Roper have, to
some extent, limited the ability of criminal justice system to
impose adult sanctions on juvenile offenders, sensationalist media
coverage of a limited number of exceptional cases has inflamed
public opinion in favor of adult-like treatment of juveniles. 10 7 As
Id. at 578.
107 Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 495,
106

526 (2004).
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long as public opinion favors punitive, adult-like treatment for
juveniles, legislative remedies to the problem of placing juveniles
in solitary confinement are unlikely. Judicial remedies are also
unlikely given the broad discretion granted to state prison officials
and general reluctance of judges to interfere with that discretion.
The view of the Second Circuit Court Appeals in Sostre is
indicative of this great degree of deference: "For a federal court...
to place a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose on an
inmate is a drastic interference with the state's free political and
administrative processes. ' 108 It seems that federal courts view the
requirements of Federalism as more constitutionally significant
than the plight of individual inmates in solitary confinement.
Given the likely unwillingness of courts and legislatures to
respond to the issue of solitary confinement of juveniles in adult
facilities, advocacy and research efforts aimed at changing public
opinion, and the opinion of corrections officials, remain the most viable
alternatives. Such efforts proved to be effective in the case of J.S.
Based on the advocacy efforts of a prisoners' rights
organization, J.S.'s sentence of solitary confinement was
ultimately reduced to approximately 8 months. Rather than
attempting to file a lawsuit, which would have taken years to
resolve and could have established unfavorable precedent on the
issue of solitary confinement ofjuveniles, the organization in J.S.'s
case opted for a strategy of advocating directly to corrections
officials for a sentence reduction. After several administrative
appeals outlining the harmful effects of solitary confinement on
juveniles and sworn affidavits from medical experts substantiating
these claims, prison officials eventually agreed to a reduced
sentence of 8 months for J.S. J.S.'s exemplary behavior while in
solitary confinement also played a significant role in the
willingness of prison officials to reduce his sentence.
Recently, J.S. was granted parole and will be released
almost immediately after his sentence of solitary confinement
expires. An inquiry by the Investigator General into the abuses
committed against J.S. at the "Shock Incarceration" camp is
'08 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971).
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pending. The Investigator General is also inquiring into other
suspected abuses there not involving J.S. Considering the pending
investigation into widespread abuse at the "Shock Incarceration"
camp, and the fact that J.S. was granted parole, it appears unlikely
that he will face additional criminal charges for running away from
the abusive conditions at the camp. Should he be charged, he may
be able to raise a duress defense if the allegations of abuse and
inability to obtain redress through the grievance system are
substantiated by the Investigator General inquiry.'°9
J.S.'s case is extraordinary, not only for the particular
circumstances which led to his placement in solitary confinement,
but also for the resilience and mental fortitude he demonstrated as
a 16-year-old spending months in isolation. Thus far, he has not
severely decompensated, mentally or physically, and has managed
to remain in relatively good spirits without displaying any
indications of "SHU Syndrome." 110 This is not the case for many
individuals in solitary, who develop "SHU Syndrome" after only a
few weeks or months in isolation.
In sum, from a policy perspective, the solitary confinement
of juveniles is counterproductive because it irreversibly damages
normal development and may lead to future criminal behavior. From
a constitutional perspective, the solitary confinement of juveniles
seems to be teetering over the constitutional edge in light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions in Graham and Roper. At least one
federal district judge has recognized the reality that juveniles should
be accorded different protections under the law than adults,
particularly in the context of the criminal justice system:

109

See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1980). There, the Court

stated that a prison escapee could obtain an defense of duress to prison escape if
can demonstrate (1) a serious, imminent threat to his safety and (2) that escape
was his only reasonable alternative given the imminence of the threat. Id.
110 SHU Syndrome is characterized by the following: (1) hyperresponsitivity to
external stimuli, (2) perceptual distortions, illusions, and hallucinations, (3)
panic attacks, (4) difficulties with thinking, concentration, and memory, (5)
intrusive obsessional thoughts, (6) overt paranoia, and (7) problems with
impulse control. See Grassian, supranote 19, at 335-36.
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If a boy were confined indoors by his parents, given no
education or exercise and allowed no visitors, and his
medical needs were ignored, it is likely that the state would
intervene and remove the child for his own protection.
Certainly, then, the state . . . cannot treat the boy in the

same manner and justify having deprived him of his liberty.
Children are not chattels.II
The real paradox is that solitary confinement, the harshest
possible sanction in the prison context, is not reserved for the most
culpable offenders. Many of the inmates in solitary confinement
are simply mentally ill and unable to conform their behavior to
prison regulations. 112 They may end up in solitary confinement for
violations such as refusing a direct order, being out of place, or
creating a disturbance. 113 If the trend of treating juveniles like
adults in the criminal system continues, juveniles will continue to
account for an increasingly greater proportion of the solitary
confinement population because isolation is one of the few places
where juveniles are safe in prison. Most problematic, however, is
the fact that solitary confinement is often imposed on those who
are least deserving of this most severe punishment, and most illequipped to survive its dangers. As Dr. Stuart Grassian has written:
It is a great irony that as one passes through the levels of
incarceration - from the minimum to the moderate to the
maximum security institutions, and then to the solitary
confinement section of these institutions - one does not pass
deeper and deeper into a subpopulation of the most ruthlessly
Inmates of the Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1367 (D.
R.I. 1972) (citation omitted).
112 CORR. Ass'N OF N.Y., supra note 3, at 22 ( "Research has demonstrated that
mentally disordered inmates have greater difficulty conforming to strict
correctional regimens than non-mentally ill inmates and are more likely to
accumulate infractions and end up in disciplinary confinement").
113 According to the Correctional Association of New York, in 2003, 2 5 % of
New York's disciplinary confinement population was sentenced for creating a
disturbance or demonstration. Id. at 18. Only 10% were sentenced for assaults.
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calculating criminals. Instead, ironically and tragically, one
comes full circle back to those who are emotionally fragile
and, often, severely mentally ill. The laws and practices that
have established and perpetuated this tragedy deeply offend
any sense of common human decency. 114

114

Grassian, supra note 19, at 355.

